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Abstract Many low-price guarantees are offered by small local firms who
compete against much larger rivals. The prices of these larger rivals are
often set nationally and thus are independent of local market conditions. Our
objective in this paper is to explain why small firms in such environments
might nevertheless adopt low-price guarantees. We characterize when offering
a low-price guarantee is profitable, and assess which form it should take
(i.e., conditional on offering a low-price guarantee, should the small firm offer
to match or beat its larger competitor’s prices). We also assess the implications
thereof (i.e., do the low-price guarantees benefit or harm the small firm’s
customers).
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1 Introduction
Many firms have a “low-price guarantee” policy in which they promise to
match or beat any lower price announced by a competitor. Previous studies
suggest that these guarantees facilitate implicit price collusion by adversely
affecting firms’ pricing incentives. In practice, however, many low-price guar-
antees are offered by small, local firms who compete against much larger
rivals.1 These larger rivals may or may not be aware of the small firms’ prices,
and even when they are aware, they may not be able to respond to them if,
as is often the case, their pricing decisions are made at the national level.2 In
these settings, the traditional explanation of low-price guarantees as a means
of dampening competition seems unlikely.
Our objective in this paper is to explain why small, local firms might want
to adopt low-price guarantees even if they would have no effect on their larger
rivals’ prices.3 Taking the larger rivals’ prices as exogeneous, we characterize
what form the guarantees should take (i.e., should the firms offer to match or
beat their larger rivals’ prices), and we assess the implications thereof (i.e., do
the guarantees make the firms’ customers better or worse off).
Two vignettes help to illustrate the kinds of scenarios we have in mind. Con-
sider first the case of Eddie’s Electronics, a local store in southwest Missouri.4
It competes against national electronics’ chain stores, which sell many of the
same branded products. Eddie’s is known for its exceptional customer service,
and as a result, its prices are on the high end. Should it consider offering
a low-price guarantee? Under what conditions? Next, consider the case of
Sam’s Hardware, also a local store in southwest Missouri. Like Eddie’s, Sam’s
competes primarily against much larger rivals. Unlike Eddie’s, however, Sam’s
is not known for offering good customer service. Its customers tend to be more
1Using Arbatskaya et al.’s (2004) data, we are able to classify 96 different firms according to
whether they are a national chain store, a local chain store (which we define as 10 or fewer stores
all located within the same state), an internet-only store, or a store with a single outlet. We find
that 63 firms are either a national chain store or an internet-only store, 12 are local chain stores,
and 21 are single outlet stores.
2Chain stores in the U.K. invariably follow national pricing policies (i.e., they set the same prices in
every store regardless of where the store is located). In contrast, local pricing is more common in
the U.S., where individual managers may have pricing discretion. However, even in this case, local
prices may be constrained by the company’s internet sales operations and the prices consumers
can obtain on the company’s website.
3The inspiration for this paper stems from March 2008, when Ocado, a small, high-end UK
grocery home shopping business with average orders of 70,000 a week and a single distribution
centre, began offering a price-matching guarantee aimed solely at the market leader, Tesco, which
serves more than 20 million customers every week and which has a national pricing strategy. We
found this to be puzzling because (a) it seemed clear that the usual explanation for low-price
guarantees (i.e., that it affects rivals’ pricing incentives) did not hold in this case, and (b) Ocado’s
guarantee could not have been for the purpose of signaling of low prices because Ocado was widely
recognized at the time as being considerably more expensive than Tesco.
4These are fictional characters, and any resemblance to real firms is unintended and coincidental.
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price sensitive on average than those of its larger rivals, and thus, its prices
tend to be lower. Should Sam’s consider offering a low-price guarantee? If so,
should it offer to match or beat its rivals’ prices?
One might think that Sam’s would have nothing to lose by signaling its lower
prices to consumers (either by offering to match or beat prices), and therefore,
that adopting a low-price guarantee would always be beneficial for Sam’s.5 On
the other hand, if consumers already know that Sam’s prices are lower than
its competitors’ prices, why bother? In Eddie’s case, one might question why
Eddie’s would ever want to sell for less by offering to match or beat its rivals’
lower prices, when it could do so more directly by lowering its own prices.
We suggest that in both cases there are circumstances in which low-price
guarantees can profitably be used to segment consumers into those who would
avail themselves of the guarantees and those who would not, and that the
prices of the chain stores can conveniently serve as anchors against which to
enable the discrimination. We also suggest, however, that there are plausible
circumstances in which segmenting consumers would not be profitable.
We are not the first to propose that low-price guarantees can be used
to segment consumers (see, for example, Png and Hirshleifer 1987), but we
are the first, to our knowledge, to explain why (i) price-matching guarantees
might sometimes be optimal, (ii) price-beating guarantees might sometimes
be optimal, and (iii) no guarantee might sometimes be optimal, all within the
same market setting. Our theory makes use of an important stylized fact of the
markets we consider, which is that although smaller firms necessarily take into
account the prices charged by their larger rivals, the larger firms’ prices may be
largely independent of the smaller firms’ prices (this is particularly true when
the larger firms’ prices are set nationally). This fact allows the smaller firms
to use the larger firms’ prices as anchors when setting their own prices and
choosing which kinds of low-price guarantees, if any, to offer.
Depending on parameter values, any outcome is possible: one might observe
the small firm adopting no guarantee, a price-matching guarantee, or a price-
beating guarantee. In the case of Eddie’s Electronics, we find that price-
beating guarantees are optimal (although price-matching guarantees might
also be profitable) if the chain-store’s price is not much lower; price-matching
guarantees are optimal if the chain-store’s price is moderately lower (although
price-beating guarantees would also be profitable); and no guarantee is opti-
mal if the chain-store’s price is much lower. In the case of Sam’s Hardware,
however, price-beating guarantees are optimal (although price-matching guar-
antees would also be profitable) if the chain-store’s price is not much higher;
price-beating guarantees are optimal (although price-matching guarantees
would then not be profitable) if the chain-store’s price is moderately higher;
and no guarantee is optimal if instead the chain-store’s price is significantly
higher.
5The use of low-price guarantees as a signaling device has been explored by Moorthy and Winter
(2006).
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The intuition for these results is as follows. For any given item, the discrim-
ination takes place around an anchor price, which is the price set by the rival
chain store on that item.6 Consumers who buy from the small firm but who
do not make use of its guarantee pay list price. We assume these consumers
as a group are relatively less price sensitive. In contrast, consumers who buy
from the small firm and who invoke its guarantee pay a price which is either at
or below the anchor price, depending on whether the small firm has promised
to match or beat its rivals’ prices. These consumers tend to be relatively more
price sensitive.
It follows that if the anchor price is very high, discrimination might not be
profitable for the small firm because the distortion it would have to make
to ensure that its list price was above the anchor price might result in a
price that is too high for the group that does not make use of the guarantee.
And, conversely, if the anchor price is very low, discrimination might not be
profitable because the price paid by the consumers who do use the guarantee
might then be too low relative to what the small firm would have liked to have
charged them.
For intermediate cases, it is useful to compare the anchor price to the price
the small firm would ideally like to charge if it could not discriminate. If the
anchor price is only slightly higher or lower than the small firm’s optimal
uniform price, price-beating guarantees tend to do very well because they can
be used to ‘overcut’. To achieve overcutting, the firm optimally sets its list price
at the level that maximizes its profit from its less price-sensitive consumers
(which will be above the anchor price), and relies on the price-beating feature
of its guarantee to lower its effective selling price to the level that maximizes
its profit from its more price sensitive consumers (who are the ones who take
advantage of the guarantee). If the anchor price is instead moderately higher
or lower than the small firm’s optimal uniform price, distortions relative to the
two profit-maximizing group prices are inevitable. In these cases, a distortion
at the higher end can best be mitigated when price-beating guarantees are
used, whereas distortions at the lower end can best be mitigated when price-
matching guarantees are used (indeed, they would be even worse if price-
beating guarantees were used).
Taken together, therefore, our analysis suggests that, when profitable, price-
matching guarantees are likely to be more suitable for higher priced firms such
as Eddie’s Electronics, whereas price-beating guarantees are likely to be more
suitable for lower priced firms such as Sam’s Hardware (although there are
some exceptions, for example, price-beating guarantees would be better for
Eddie’s Electronics when the chain-store’s price is only slightly lower).
Before proceeding to review the literature, it is worth noting that the use
of low-price guarantees to discriminate among consumers has been criticized
6We implicitly assume that if the small firm competes against more than one chain store, the chain
stores all set the same price on the relevant item. This simplifies the exposition but is not essential
for our results.
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because of a perception that too few customers would make use of the
guarantees. However, there is some indication that usage rates—whatever they
were in the past—may be changing with the emergence of the web as a way
for consumers who are so inclined to gather competitor price information at
relatively low cost, and at the same time, with a click of a button and a printer,
to provide the necessary proof of a rival’s lower price at the point of sale.
Although we are unaware of systematic evidence of this, we offer two recent
examples from the UK which suggest that, at least in some cases, usage by
consumers has been substantial. Our first example is that of John Lewis, a
department store in the UK, which has a long-standing policy of boasting that
they are “never knowingly undersold”. Citing the costs of matching competi-
tor’s prices on the web as being prohibitive, John Lewis recently restricted
its price guarantee to apply only to rivals with brick-and-mortar shops. Our
second example is that of the leading UK retailer, Tesco, which had to abandon
its double the difference price-beating guarantee after just two months due to
the large number of unanticipated redemptions by consumers. Although these
examples are of policies that involve large firms and ultimately failed, they do
suggest that a surprising number of consumers may take advantage of these
guarantees when offered.
1.1 Related literature
Previous theoretical studies suggest that low-price guarantees may facilitate
implicit price collusion. The idea is that by promising to match or beat any
lower price announced by its rivals, a firm can reduce its rivals’ incentives to
cut prices in the first place.7 Although there is empirical evidence to suggest
that this story may hold at least for some markets,8 it seems less plausible for
the kinds of markets we are considering. We have thus ruled it out a priori by
assuming that the chain-store’s price is independent of the prices set by the
small firm.
It has also been suggested that low-price guarantees may be used to signal
low prices to consumers (see, for example, Jain and Srivastava 2000; Moorthy
and Winter 2006). The idea is that high-priced firms would find it too costly to
mimic a low-priced firm’s strategy of offering low-price guarantees because too
many consumers would request refunds. Although there is evidence consistent
with this story as well, casual observation suggests that, for the markets
we consider, firms with low-price guarantees do not always have the lowest
prices.
7See, for example, the seminal papers by Hay (1982) and Salop (1986), and the early contributions
by Baye and Kovenock (1994), Zhang (1995), Edlin and Emch (1999) and Hviid and Shaffer
(1999). More recently, Coughlan and Shaffer (2009) consider the effect of these guarantees on
firms’ product-line choices.
8See the evidence presented in Hess and Gerstner (1991) and Arbatskaya et al. (1999, 2006).
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This leaves price discrimination as a possible motive. To our knowledge,
the literature on the use of low-price guarantees to discriminate among
consumers consists of four papers: Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Corts (1997),
Chen et al. (2001a) and Nalca et al. (2010).9 Like us, these authors assume
that some consumers are willing to use the guarantees, while others are not.
In Png and Hirschleifer, “tourists” never shop around, while “locals” always
take advantage of the best deal. They find that price-matching guarantees
are always profitable, and both groups always end up paying higher prices.
They do not consider price-beating guarantees. Corts distinguishes between
sophisticated and unsophisticated customers and finds that prices to the so-
phisticated customers are always at marginal cost as a result of the firms’
price-beating guarantees. In his model, price-matching guarantees are never
observed when both price-matching and price-beating guarantees are feasible,
and price-beating guarantees are always observed over uniform pricing. Chen
et al. (2001a) are the first to show that price-matching guarantees need not
be more profitable than uniform pricing. The reason is that, in their model,
price-matching guarantees can increase competition for some consumers for
some parameter values. They do not consider price-beating guarantees. Nalca
et al. consider whether firms might want to discriminate not just on whether
consumers are informed or uninformed, but also on whether the product is
available at the rival store. Like Png and Hirschleifer and Chen et al., they do
not consider price-beating guarantees.
Our results differ from the results in these papers in part because we are
able to separate out the effects of pure price discrimination from the effects of
competition. In those models, price discrimination occurs because one firm
happens to have a lower list price than the other firm, with competition
determining the level. In our model, price discrimination occurs because the
small firm is able to use the chain-store’s price as an anchor in sorting among
consumers. But because the chain-store’s price is unaffected by the local firm’s
prices, the low-price guarantees do not simultaneously play a role in affecting
competition. As a result, we are able to explain why a small firm might
sometimes find price-matching to be optimal, sometimes find price-beating to
be optimal, and sometimes find no guarantee to be optimal.
Our analysis also relates to the vast literature on third-degree price discrim-
ination. Most of this literature, however, restricts attention to a monopolist
seller, and none to our knowledge considers the impact of anchoring.10 Taking
anchoring into account yields new results. In the traditional price discrimina-
tion literature, the optimal uniform price is bounded above by the optimal
group price for the less price-sensitive group and below by the optimal group
9Edlin (1990) discusses discriminatory motives for the use of low-price guarantees. However, the
symmetry of his model permits no price dispersion in equilibrium, and hence there is no actual
price discrimination.
10See Tirole (1988) and the chapters by Varian (1989) and Stole (2007) for surveys of this
literature.
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price for the more price-sensitive group. However, with anchoring, it is not
uncommon for the prices in both groups to be weakly higher (or weakly
lower) than what they would have been under traditional third-degree price
discrimination, and in some instances, it is even possible for the prices in both
groups to be weakly higher than the optimal uniform price.
Non-traditional results have also been found in the more specialized liter-
ature on behavior-based price discrimination, where firms target discounts to
their own customers as well as to their rival’s customers, and where the strong
and the weak markets are endogenously determined.11 This literature tends
to find that prices to both groups will fall relative to the non-discriminatory
uniform prices, whereas in our case, the opposite may be true—the prices to
both groups may be weakly higher. Moreover, in our case, targeting individual
consumers is not feasible, and the market segmentation occurs along more
traditional lines.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
considers the effects of price-matching guarantees. Section 4 considers the
effects of price-beating gaurantees. Section 5 extends the model to consider
welfare effects, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We focus on the managerial decisions of a small, locally operated firm, which
competes against one or more nationally operated chain stores in selling a
branded product. The firms’ products are imperfect substitutes in the sense
that, at equal prices, some consumers will prefer buying from the local firm
while others will prefer buying from the chain stores.12
The local firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve that is decreasing
in its own price, P, and increasing in the common price of its rivals, Px. We
assume throughout our analysis that Px is exogenous in the sense that it is
unaffected by the local firm’s pricing decisions.13
We further assume that consumers differ in their willingness to invoke the
price guarantees. Some consumers, which we denote as group A consumers,
never use price guarantees. These consumers always buy at list prices. In
11See Corts (1998) for a discussion of strong and weak markets. For other early contributions to
this literature, see Shaffer and Zhang (1995, 2002), Chen (1997), Chen et al. (2001b) and Chen and
Iyer (2002).
12For example, some consumers may prefer the personalized attention they receive from the
smaller store, while others may place more value on the convenience of buying from a store that
is located closer to home.
13This assumption is justified, for example, if the chain-stores’ prices are determined at the national
level and implemented uniformly across local markets, which is the case for many markets in the
United Kingdom (Dobson and Waterson 2005). Alternatively, one can think of the analysis in the
paper as characterizing the small firm’s “reaction function” to the chain stores’ prices. One can
then endogenously implement the various regimes identified in Tables 2 and 3 by varying up or
down the marginal costs of the chain stores.
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contrast, the remaining consumers, which we denote as group B consumers,
use price guarantees whenever possible.14 These consumers are assumed to be
on average more price sensitive than the consumers in group A.
Let c denote the local firm’s marginal cost. Let Di(P; Px) denote its demand
from group i consumers, i = A, B. Then, the firm’s maximized profit under
uniform pricing is given by
U (Px) ≡ (PU − c) DA(PU ; Px) + (PU − c) DB(PU ; Px), (1)
where the first term is the profit it receives from group A consumers, the
second term is the profit it receives from group B consumers, and PU is the
profit-maximizing uniform price:
PU (Px) ≡ arg max
P
(P − c) DA(P; Px) + (P − c) DB(P; Px).
This price, which is the inverse of the firm’s average elasticity of demand
across the two groups, is a compromise between the price that would maximize
its profit from the (less elastic) group A consumers and the price that would
maximize its profit from the (more elastic) group B consumers. It follows that
since the group B consumers are more elastic,
PB(Px) < PU (Px) < PA(Px), (2)
where Pi(Px) is the price that maximizes the firm’s profit from the group i
consumers,
Pi(Px) ≡ arg max
P
(P − c) Di(P; Px) i = A, B.
If the local firm could directly engage in price discrimination between
the two groups, it would want to charge PA(Px) to group A consumers and
PB(Px) to group B consumers. However, when the discrimination can only
occur indirectly, through the use of low-price guarantees, then, as we shall see,
whether or not the local firm can reach these ideals will depend on both the
form of the guarantee it chooses and the anchor price of the chain store.
We assume for convenience that profit functions are concave, so that the
local firm’s profit-maximizing prices can be found from first-order conditions.
We also assume that whereas the chain store’s price does not depend on the
price set by the local firm (for the reasons we have indicated), the local firm’s
prices will in general be sensitive to the prices charged by the chain store. In
particular, we assume that the local firm’s profit-maximizing prices are greater
14These behavioral types are caricatures of the kinds of consumers the local firm might be
expected to find in practice. Group A consumers, for example, may not be aware of the
firm’s low-price guarantee, or they may think that any potential savings are outweighed by the
inconvenience/hassle costs of asking for a refund. In contrast, group B consumers always seek
out the best deal, even if it means incurring extra hassle. When buying from the local firm, these
consumers prefer to purchase at the lowest possible price.
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than c (which implies that the firm has some market power), and that these
prices are increasing in Px (which implies that reaction functions are upward
sloping, as they will be, for example, if demands are linear). We further assume
that own effects dominate cross effects in demand, so that the slope of Pi(Px),
i = A, B, U , is less than unity.
These assumptions ensure that if Px is low enough, the local firm would
want to set PA > Px and PB > Px, whereas if Px is high enough, the local firm
would want to set PA < Px and PB < Px. For intermediate values of Px, the
local firm would want to set PA > Px to group A consumers (if it could) and
PB < Px to group B consumers (if it could).
3 Price-matching guarantees
A price-matching guarantee is a promise to match any lower price offered by a
competitor on an identical item. This means that if the local firm announces a
list price of P > Px and offers a price-matching guarantee, then any consumer
who takes advantage of the offer will be able to buy at the price Px, whereas
any consumer who does not take advantage of the offer will pay P. Since
only group B consumers use the guarantee, it follows that the local firm’s




(P − c) DA(P; Px) + (min {P, Px} − c) DB (min {P, Px} ; Px) . (3)
It should be clear from Eq. 3 that if there is to be an effect from offering a
price-matching guarantee, it must be because groups A and B pay different
prices, and thus, the local firm’s maximization problem in any setting in which
price matching is optimal can be rewritten as
max
P≥Px
(P − c) DA(P; Px) + (Px − c) DB(Px; Px). (4)
Since the chain-store’s price is exogenous, the profit that comes from the
second term in Eq. 4 is also exogenous, which means that the local firm will
choose P to maximize its profit from the group A consumers as long as Px is
not too high (i.e., as long as Px < PA(Px)). Otherwise, the constraint in Eq. 4
is binding and the firm is better served with no guarantee.
Assuming therefore that the chain-store’s price is less than the optimal price
to group A consumers, Px < PA(Px), the local firm obtains a maximized profit
under price matching of
PM(Px) ≡ (PA − c) DA(PA; Px) + (Px − c) DB (Px; Px) . (5)
Table 1 below provides a group-by-group comparison of the local firm’s
profits in Eqs. 1 and 5. Since price-matching allows the local firm to charge
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Table 1 Contribution to total profits from each group
Total profit Group A Group B
PM(Px) (PA − c) DA(PA; Px) (Px − c) DB (Px; Px)
U (Px) (PU − c) DA(PU ; Px) (PU − c) DB(PU ; Px)
its optimal price to group A consumers, whereas it cannot do so in the absence
of price matching, it should be clear that the firm earns higher profit from
group A consumers when it offers price matching than when it does not. The
situation with respect to group B consumers, however, is more complicated.
Although it is possible that the firm will also earn higher profit from group B
consumers when it offers price-matching (this would be the case, for example,
if the chain store’s price was equal to PB), this need not be the case. For some
values of Px, it would incur a loss. The loss from the group B consumers may
even outweigh the gain from the group A consumers.
In the Appendix, we characterize the domain of anchor prices Px for which
the net gain from group A consumers outweighs any net loss from group B
consumers, PM(Px) ≥ U (Px). We also demonstrate the existence of a lower
bound on Px, PPML , which is less than PB, and an upper bound on Px, P
PM
H ,
which is between PU and PA, such that for all values of Px between PPML
and PPMH , the local firm’s profit under price matching will be higher than that
under uniform pricing. For all values of Px which are outside of these bounds,
we show that the local firm’s profit will be lower under price matching (than
under uniform pricing). Thus, our analysis yields five intervals with distinct
implications for prices and guarantees:
3.1 Implications for Eddie’s Electronics and Sam’s Hardware
Table 2 has implications for the two cases presented in the Introduction. We
highlight these implications first for the case of Eddie’s Electronics and then
for the case of Sam’s Hardware.
Eddie’s Electronics Recall that Eddie’s prices are higher than those of its
chain-store competitors in the absence of price matching, which implies that
Table 2 Effect of different chain-store prices
Range Price in Price in Guarantee
market A market B












Px > PPMH PU PU None
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Px < PU . Thus, the case of Eddie’s Electronics corresponds to the first three
rows of Table 2. This yields the following managerial implications:
• If the chain-store’s price is only slightly less than Eddie’s optimal uniform
price, Px ∈ (PB, PU ), Eddie’s should offer to match prices and raise its list
price to PA in order to optimally serve its group A consumers. Group B
consumers who buy from Eddie’s will use Eddie’s guarantee to lower their
effective purchasing price to Px. Notice that group A consumers will be
no worse off than if they were discriminated against directly, but group
B consumers will be worse off than if they were discriminated against
directly.
• Eddie’s optimal strategy is the same if the chain-store’s price is moderately




, but in this case
group B consumers will actually be better off (not worse off) than if they
were discriminated against directly.
• If the chain-store’s price is significantly less than Eddie’s optimal uniform
price, Px < PPML , Eddie’s should not offer a price-matching guarantee and
continue to charge PU .
Anchoring on the chain-store’s price implies that group A consumers will
lose from Eddie’s policy, whereas group B consumers will gain from it, when
price-matching is offered.
Sam’s Hardware The case of Sam’s Hardware corresponds to the fourth and
fifth rows of Table 2, which follows because Sam’s prices are lower than those
of its chain-store competitors in the absence of price matching. We thus have
the following managerial implications for Sam’s Hardware:





, Sam’s should offer a price-matching guarantee and
raise its list price to PA in order to optimally serve its group A consumers.
Group B consumers who buy from Sam’s will use Sam’s guarantee to lower
their effective purchasing price to Px.
• If the chain-store’s price is moderately higher (or significantly higher) than
Sam’s optimal uniform price, Px > PPMH , Sam’s should not offer a price-
matching guarantee.
Anchoring on the chain-store’s price implies that group B consumers will
not only be worse off than if Sam’s had discriminated against them directly
(Px > PB), they will also be worse off period (Px > PU ). And since Sam’s list
price increases, group A consumers will also be worse off. It follows that all
consumers will lose from Sam’s policy of price-matching.
3.2 Summary
These observations suggest that discrimination that occurs via anchoring
on the chain-store’s price yields results that are qualitatively different from
what one would get with direct price discrimination, and collectively they
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demonstrate that neither price-matching guarantees nor uniform pricing will
always be preferred. We formally summarize these results as follows.
Proposition 1 The local f irm earns strictly higher prof it under price matching
than under uniform pricing if and only if the chain-store’s price is such that
PPML < Px < P
PM
H .
Intuitively, the local firm would like to discriminate between its consumers
by setting a high list price for its group A consumers and taking advantage,
through its offer to match, of lower list prices elsewhere to charge a lower price
to its group B consumers. The problem is that the lower list prices elsewhere
need not have any relation to the optimal price the local firm would like to
charge its group B consumers. Thus, anchoring on these list prices may not be
profitable, and even if it is profitable, group B consumers may or may not gain.
Several implications follow from Proposition 1. First, as we have already
explained, price-matching guarantees are not always optimal. Although this
implication accords with what one observes in reality (i.e., not all firms choose
to have price-matching guarantees), it contrasts with the findings of many, if
not most, models of price-matching guarantees, which are set up to explain why
firms might want to match prices but not why they would not.15 In contrast, our
analysis suggests that whether or not price matching will be more profitable
than uniform pricing for the local firm depends on the prices charged by the
chain store.
Second, we find that the difference in the local firm’s profit in the two cases
is not monotonic. Price matching is more profitable than uniform pricing for
intermediate values of Px but less profitable than uniform pricing when the
anchor price is very low or very high.
Third, we find that price matching via anchoring is an imperfect substitute
for direct price discrimination. If the local firm could directly charge different
prices, it would want to charge PA to group A consumers and PB to group B
consumers. With price matching, the firm does indeed charge PA to the group
A consumers, but unfortunately for the local firm, group B consumers will only
be able to purchase at Px, which need not be equal to PB.
To further emphasize that price matching via anchoring is an imperfect
substitute for direct price discrimination, recall that in the latter case, prices
generally rise to some consumer groups and fall to others. In contrast, as
illustrated in Fig. 1, for all Px such that PU < Px < PPMH , price matching will
be optimal and there will be a price increase, not only for group A consumers,
but also for group B consumers (i.e., prices to both groups will rise).
Finally, note that this implication of overall higher prices is also predicted
by other models in the literature on low-price guarantees, but usually in the
15Many models in the literature on price guarantees over explain the phenomenon they attempt
to describe (e.g., the model may predict that price matching emerges as the unique outcome for all
parameter values).
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context of dampening competition. We have abstracted from this by assuming
the chain-store’s price is exogenous.
4 Price-beating guarantees
We now expand the strategy space to include guarantees in which a firm offers
to beat any lower price announced by a competitor by some percentage λ of
the difference.16 Thus, if the local firm offers a price-beating guarantee and
chooses a list price of P > Px, then any consumer who does not take advantage
of the guarantee pays P, whereas any consumer who does takes advantage of
the guarantee pays P − (1 + λ) (P − Px), or equivalently, Px − λ · (P − Px).
For example, an offer to beat any lower price by 25% of the difference
corresponds to a λ = .25, while an offer to “double the difference” corresponds
to a λ = 1.
In practice, one might expect there to be an upper bound on the maximum
price-beating percentage a local firm will consider. Among other things, this
upper bound might depend on the kinds of products being sold, the local
firm’s tolerance for risk, and consumers’ perceptions of the believability of the
firm’s guarantee.17 Let λ denote this upper bound. It follows that since group B
16This form accounts for approximately 86% of all price-beating guarantees in Arbatskaya (2004)
et al.’s dataset. We refer the reader to their study for other descriptive statistics on price-beating
guarantees.
17See, for example, Kukar-Kinney and Walters (2003), who test consumer attitudes of price
beating guarantees using experimental survey methods. They find that a modest price beating
guarantee is perceived as being less believable but also as having a greater value to the consumer
than a price matching guarantee. Desmet and Le Negard (2005) confirm this finding using a price
beating guarantee of 10 times the difference. Interestingly, the credibility of the guarantee does
not collapse with this extreme price beating percentage.
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consumers take advantage of guarantees, whereas group A consumers do not,
the firm’s maximization problem when it offers a guarantee is given by
max
P,0≤λ≤λ
(P − c) DA(P; Px) + (S − c) DB(S; Px), (6)
where
S = P − (1 + λ) · max {P − Px, 0}
is the price at which group B consumers can buy from the local firm. Note that
price-matching is a special case of price beating. We say that price-matching
is optimal if the local firm prefers to set λ = 0, price-beating is optimal if it
prefers to set λ > 0, and no guarantee is optimal if Eq. 6 yields weakly lower
profit for the firm than it would earn under simple uniform pricing.
We will proceed with three observations. Each observation contrasts with
existing literature.
Observation 1 Previous literature suggests that when both price-matching and
price-beating guarantees are feasible, price-beating will always be chosen over
price-matching. This is the case, for example, in Corts (1995, 1997) and Hviid
and Shaffer (1994). However, it is not true in our setting. If the price set
by the chain store is less than or equal to the profit-maximizing price for
group B consumers, Px ≤ PB, then a strategy of charging a list price above Px
and offering a price-beating guarantee only makes things worse for the firm
(because it reduces the profits from the group B consumers even further).18 In
this case, charging the same list price but offering only to match prices would
yield strictly higher profit. It follows that price-matching guarantees will be
preferred over price-beating guarantees for all Px ≤ PB.
Observation 2 Previous literature also suggests that price-beating guarantees,
when observed, lead to marginal-cost pricing and low profits (because they
intensify competition and result in a prisoner’s dilemma situation). In contrast,
in our setting, when PB < Px < PA, price-beating guarantees can be extremely
profitable. To illustrate this, consider the following simple example. Suppose
group A’s profit-maximizing price is 100, group B’s profit-maximizing price is
80, and the chain-store’s price is 85. Then, the local firm can maximize its profit
by choosing a list price of P = 100 and offering to beat any lower price by
λ = .33. With this strategy, consumers in group A (who do not use the
guarantee) pay the list price of 100 while consumers in group B (who take
advantage of the guarantee) pay only 85 − .33 · (100 − 85) = 80. As a result, all
consumers face the firm’s profit-maximizing price for their respective group.
18This observation relies only on the assumed concavity of the group B consumers’ profit function.
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More generally, two elements are essential for the firm to realize its “first
best profit”: Px must lie between the profit-maximizing prices of the two
groups, and the requisite price-beating percentage must be feasible (.33 in our
example above).19 When these two elements are in place, the firm maximizes
its profit by setting a list price of PA (this maximizes its profit from the group
A consumers) and a price-beating percentage such that, given its list price
and the chain-store’s price, its effective selling price to the group B consumers
becomes PB after its guarantee is invoked (this maximizes its profit from the
group B consumers).20 This strategy dominates what the firm could earn under
price-matching, and it dominates what the firm could earn from simple uniform
pricing. In fact, it does so well that it allows the firm to earn the same profit
that would be earned if direct price discrimination were feasible.
Observation 3 Even when the firm’s first best profit cannot be realized, either
because the price-beating percentage that would be required to obtain the first
best exceeds what the firm is willing to consider, or because the chain-store’s
price exceeds PA, it is still the case that price-beating guarantees will yield
higher profit than price-matching guarantees over a wide range of parameters.
Consider, for example, the region in which PB < Px ≤ PPMH (recall that PPMH
is the price at which the local firm is indifferent between a price-matching
guarantee and uniform pricing). Then, as we showed previously, the local
firm’s profit under price matching is given by
(PA − c) DA(PA; Px) + (Px − c) DB (Px; Px) . (7)
With price-beating guarantees, the local firm can do better. It can choose
the same list price as in price-matching, P = PA, but by offering to beat the
chain-store’s price by some arbitrarily small percentage of the difference, it
can ensure that group B consumers will be able to purchase at some price P−x ,
which is close to but strictly lower than Px. This yields









Comparing Eqs. 7 and 8, it follows that the profit from the group A consumers
is the same in both cases, while the profit from the group B consumers is higher
in Eq. 8. This conclusion relies only on the concavity of the group B consumers’
19A wide range of price-beating percentages are observed in practice. Of the 163 price-beating
guarantees in Arbatskaya et al.’s (2004) data, price-beating percentages varied from a low of 10%
to a high of 310%. (Desmet and Le Negard 2005, 293) report that the Supermarket chain Carrefour
has had a price guarantee promising to refund ten times the difference.
20We call this strategy “overcutting”. Instead of lowering the price to group B consumers by
charging a list price below Px (which would also give the lower price to group A consumers),
the firm lowers the price to group B consumers by raising its list price and then offering to beat
the competitor’s lower price.
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Table 3 Effect of different chain-store prices
Range Price in Price in Guarantee
market A market B











P+A [PB, Px) PB
Px > PPBH PU PU None
profit function (as the selling price moves closer to PB, one is moving to a
position of higher profits from group B consumers).
Moreover, it follows from the continuity of the profit functions that price-
beating guarantees will continue to do better for the local firm even for Px
above PPMH , over some range. The extent of this range will depend on the set
of feasible λ. With no restrictions, on λ, for example, we know that this range
will include Px = PA because for all Px greater than PB and less than or equal
to PA, the local firm can obtain the first best, as we have discussed, by choosing
a list price of P = PA and setting λ such that the group B consumers pay PB.
Let PPBH denote the upper bound on the range of Px such that price-beating
guarantees are profitable. Then, for PB < Px ≤ PPBH , we would expect to
observe the local firm offering a price-beating guarantee, while for Px > PPBH ,
we would expect no guarantee to be offered.
Implications for prices and guarantees Our analysis thus yields five intervals
with distinct implications for prices and guarantees, see Table 3.
The notation P+A denotes a scenario in which the local firm charges a list
price which is weakly higher than PA, and the notation [PB, Px) denotes a
scenario in which the effective price to group B consumers is bounded below
by PB (inclusive of PB), and above by Px . The reason for the different
scenarios in the case of price beating is due to the local firm’s choice of λ
possibly being restricted in practice. In the absence of a restriction on λ, for
example, the price to group B consumers will always be PB when the local
firm adopts price beating, and the price to group A consumers will be PA,
unless Px > PA, in which case the price to group A consumers will necessarily
exceed PA. When the set of feasible λ is restricted and binding, the price to
the group A consumers will generally be distorted upward (greater than PA)
in order to induce the effective price to the group B consumers to be closer
to PB.
4.1 Implications for Eddie’s Electronics and Sam’s Hardware
We now present the implications of our analysis for Eddie’s and Sam’s.
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Eddie’s Electronics When both price-matching and price-beating guarantees
are feasible:
• If the chain-store’s price is only slightly less than Eddie’s optimal uniform
price, Px ∈ (PB, PU ), Eddie’s should adopt a price-beating guarantee and
raise its list price to P+A . Group B consumers who buy from Eddie’s will
then use Eddie’s guarantee to lower their effective purchasing price to
below Px. Notice that it is possible for both groups of consumers to be
strictly worse off than if they were discriminated against directly.
• If the chain-store’s price is moderately or significantly less than Eddie’s
optimal uniform price, then Eddie’s optimal strategy is the same as before.




, Eddie’s should raise its list price to PA
and adopt a price-matching policy. In the latter case, Px < PPML , Eddie’s
should not offer a guarantee and charge P = PU .
Anchoring on the chain-store’s price implies that group A consumers will
lose from Eddie’s policy, while group B consumers will gain from it, when low-
price guarantees are offered.
Sam’s Hardware When both price-matching and price-beating guarantees are
feasible:
• If the chain-store’s price is slightly to moderately higher than Sam’s




, Sam’s should offer a price-beating
guarantee and raise its list price to PA if the first best is feasible, or above
PA if the first-best is not feasible. Group B consumers who buy from Sam’s
will then use Sam’s guarantee to lower their effective purchasing price to
below Px, and possibly to PB if the first-best is feasible.
• If the chain-store’s price is significantly higher than Sam’s optimal uniform
price, Px > PPBH , Sam’s should not offer a low-price guarantee and con-
tinue to charge P = PU .
Anchoring on the chain-store’s price implies that both consumer groups may
be worse off (and will never be better off) than if Sam’s had discriminated
against them directly. Consumers in group A will always lose from Sam’s
policy, while consumers in group B may or may not gain, depending on
whether their effective price does or does not fall below PU .
4.2 Summary
We have now fully characterized when price beating does best, when price
matching does best, and when no price guarantee does best. Our results can be
summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 The local f irm earns strictly higher prof it under price beating
than under the alternatives if and only if PB < Px < PPBH . It earns strictly higher
prof it under price matching than under the alternatives if and only if PPML <
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Px < PB. It earns strictly higher prof it under uniform pricing than under the
alternatives if and only Px < PPML or Px > P
PB
H .
Proposition 2 and the proceeding discussion implies that prices to both
groups of consumers will be higher when price-beating guarantees are ob-
served than when price-matching guarantees are observed, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. In this case, the prices to the group A and B consumers are PA(Px)
and Px, respectively, under price matching, PA(Px) and PB(Px), respectively,
under price beating when λ < λ, and strictly greater than PA(Px) and strictly
greater than PB(Px), respectively, under price beating when λ = λ. The claim
follows trivially by noting that PA(Px) is increasing in Px, and Px < PB(Px)
under price matching. Note that relative to uniform pricing, however, the price
to group A consumers always increases, and the price to group B consumers
always decreases, when low-price guarantees are offered.
It also follows from Proposition 2 that there are two senses in which price-
beating guarantees can do better than price-matching guarantees. First, price-
beating guarantees can mimic direct price discrimination for all Px such that
PB < Px < PA, provided that λ is not binding. In contrast, price-matching
guarantees can mimic direct price discrimination only when Px = PB. Second,
price-beating guarantees can increase the local firm’s profit relative to uniform
pricing when Px is in the region PPMH < Px < P
PB
H , whereas price-matching
guarantees cannot. However, it also follows that price beating can sometimes
do worse than price matching. For example, price matching does better if
PPML < Px < PB. The reason is that in this case the effective selling price to the
group B consumers is already sufficiently low, and promising to beat a rival’s
already low price will only serve to exacerbate matters.
Finally, it follows that low-price guarantees are not always optimal. Indeed,
for all Px < PPML and Px > P
PB
H , uniform pricing does strictly better than
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either price matching or price beating. The intuition is that the firm would
not distort downward its effective price to the group B consumers if Px is too
low, nor would it want to distort upward its list price to the group A consumers
if Px is too high. An immediate implication of this is that low-price guarantees
will be profitable only if the chain-store’s price is in some intermediate
range.
5 A tale of two benchmarks
We have been using uniform pricing as our benchmark, and asking the ques-
tion, can the local firm do better by offering a low-price guarantee? To recap,
the answer to the firm’s question is “yes, sometimes.” Rather than charge
the same price to every consumer, the firm can potentially take advantage of
different consumers’ willingness’ to pay by going after the group A consumers
with its list price and free riding, as it were, on the chain-store’s price by
allowing its group B consumers to purchase at or below the price set by the
chain store. As long as the chain-store’s price is not too high or too low, this
will be a profitable strategy.
Uniform pricing is clearly the relevant benchmark from the firm’s per-
spective (which wants to know whether, and under what circumstances, it
can increase its profit). And it is also the relevant benchmark from a public
policy perspective if one wants to know who gains, who loses, and whether in
aggregate consumers are likely to be better or worse off. In this regard, we
have found that low-price guarantees always result in higher list prices, and
thus harm consumers in group A—but whether consumers in group B gain
or lose, however, depends on the relationship between the chain-store’s price
and the uniform price that would otherwise have been charged. As can be seen
from Fig. 1, sometimes they gain and sometimes they lose. This latter finding
is especially surprising because it suggests that there may be circumstances
in which all consumers can be made worse off from the guarantees, not just
those who are less price sensitive. However, it can also be seen that these
circumstances do not arise when price beating guarantees are feasible (Fig. 2).
In this case, the consumers in group B always benefit from the local firm’s
low-price guarantee.
It follows that a policy of banning price-beating guarantees, while allowing
price-matching guarantees (i.e., moving from Figs. 2 to 1), for example, might
unambiguously make things worse for consumers—hardly a good outcome
for policy. More generally, however, a policy assessment of low-price guar-
antees likely involves a tradeoff; the guarantees make group A consumers
worse off while making group B consumers and the firm better off. It then
becomes an empirical question whether in aggregate society will be better or
worse off.
And this is where a second benchmark comes into play. Short of actually
estimating demand curves in any particular instance, and aggregating gains
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and losses in a brute force manner, there is a large body of literature which
has looked at the welfare effects of direct price discrimination. Some of this
literature is insightful. It suggests that one can usefully express the policy
tradeoff in terms of a misallocation effect and an output effect. The former
effect arises because, with discrimination, output is inefficiently distributed
across markets. This negative feature of discriminatory pricing, however, may
be offset if there is an increase in output sold to consumers, which is socially
desirable because prices exceed marginal cost.
The key is to identify when the output effect will offset the misallocation
effect. It was first shown by Robinson (1933), then by Schmalensee (1981),
and most recently by Aguirre et al. (2010) that the curvature of demands is
critical in determining the sign of the output effect. With linear demands, for
example, it is known that if both markets are served at the uniform price,
output will be unchanged under discrimination, and thus discrimination will
be unambiguously bad. More generally, they have found that the more convex
is the demand curve of the group B consumers relative to that of the group A
consumers, the more likely the output effect will be positive, and thus the more
likely price discrimination will be good.
While our intent is not to recreate their analyses, we can nevertheless
usefully apply their insights to our model because of the following surprising
feature of our analysis: in a setting in which both price-matching and price-
beating guarantees are feasible, if price matching (price beating) is observed,
then the effective selling prices to the two groups of consumers will be weakly
lower (higher) than they would have been under direct price discrimination.
This follows immediately from Fig. 2 because in the case of price matching,
which holds for the region PPML < Px < PB, group A consumers pay PA and
group B consumers pay less than PB, whereas in the case of price beating,
which holds for the region PB < Px < PPBH , group A consumers always pay at
least PA and group B consumers always pay at least PB.
It follows therefore that if one were to conclude that direct price dis-
crimination would reduce welfare in a given instance, then one must also
conclude that price-beating guarantees would reduce welfare in the same
instance, whereas the latter might still lead to lower welfare even if direct price
discrimination would not. Conversely, if one were to conclude that direct price
discrimination would increase welfare in a given instance, then one must also
conclude that price-matching guarantees would increase welfare in the same
instance, whereas the latter might still lead to higher welfare even if direct
price discrimination would not.
For a more thorough understanding of the theoretical conditions under
which welfare can be expected to rise or fall under direct price discrimination
by a monopolist, we refer the interested reader to Aguirre et al. (2010). In
the abstract, however, and for the reasons just discussed, we see no rea-
son for policy makers to condemn the use of low-price guarantees per se,
and even less reason for policy makers to ban price-beating while allowing
price-matching.
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6 Conclusion
Our objective in this paper was to explain why small, local firms might
want to adopt low-price guarantees even if they would have no effect on
their larger rivals’ prices.21 The answer we hypothesized was that the firms
might be using their guarantees to effectively discriminate between consumer
groups with different price sensitivities (in other words, to price discriminate).
However, different from existing theory, we offered a theory of price discrim-
ination based on anchoring, which led to some unexpected qualitative insights
(e.g., with price-matching guarantees, it is actually possible for both consumer
groups to pay higher prices with low-price guarantees than without). It also
meant that we could offer meaningful prescriptions as to when a firm should
adopt a price-matching guarantee versus a price-beating guarantee, and when
a firm would be better off offering no price guarantee.
The setting we focused on distinguishes our paper from much of the
previous literature on low-price guarantees in which the effects of low-price
guarantees are invariably wrapped up in their ability, more or less, to reduce
rivals’ incentives to cut prices. As a result, we are able to offer a more nuanced,
and balanced policy perspective, in contrast to the calls of some authors to
ban low-price guarantees.22 In our model, low-price guarantees might be pro-
competitive or anti-competitive, depending on the circumstance, and in this
sense we echo the conclusion of Chen et al. (2001a) that low-price guarantees
need not reduce welfare.
More importantly, we are the first, to our knowledge, to offer managerial
guidance as to whether and when a firm should offer a low-price guarantee,
and what form it should take. In contrast, many authors end up explaining too
much in the sense that low-price guarantees are always profitable. Here, low-
price guarantees may or may not be profitable.
We are also the first, to our knowledge, to consider the effects of an upper
bound on the maximum price-beating percentage a firm would consider, and
to incorporate explicitly this constraint into the analysis. As it turns out,
this constraint, if binding, matters from the consumers’ perspective, because
without any constraints, they would be always be paying lower prices. Thus, a
firm that decides that offering a price beating guarantee in which it promises to
beat any rival’s lower price by 50% of the difference in price is the maximum
it would be willing to consider, say because of concerns of too much exposure
21Our maintained assumption that the chain-stores’ prices are independent of the local firm’s
prices is not as restrictive as it may seem. One can also think of the analysis here as characterizing
the small firm’s “reaction function" to the chain stores’ prices. By varying up or down the marginal
costs of the chain stores, one can then endogenously implement each of the regimes identified in
Tables 2 and 3.
22See the articles by Sargent (1993) and Edlin (1997), and discussion in the survey by Winter
(2008).
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to risk if the rival should price lower than expected, might inadvertently be
harming its own consumers.
A useful direction for future research might be to use our framework to
explore other types of low-price guarantees observed in practice. One could
then begin to map out a more comprehensive ranking of the different types.
For example, Arbatskaya et al. (2004) found that some firms offer to beat a
rival’s lower price by some percentage of the rival’s price, and we note that
Asda, a supermarket in the UK, recently promised to beat its rival’s price by
10% regardless of whose price was lower. Analyses of these alternative types of
low-price guarantees, and when managers might want to offer them, is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we characterize the set of prices Px for which the net gain
from group A consumers in Table 1 outweighs any net loss from group B
consumers in Table 1 when moving from a regime of uniform pricing to a
regime of price matching. We also demonstrate the existence of a lower bound
on Px, PPML , which is less than PB, and an upper bound on Px, P
PM
H , which
is between PU and PA, such that for all values of Px between PPML and P
PM
H ,
the firm’s profit under price matching will be higher than that under uniform
pricing.
To compute PPML (Px) and P
PM
H (Px), we define (Pi; Px) as:
(Pi; Px) ≡ (PA − c) DA(PA; Px) + (Pi − c) DB(Pi; Px)
− (PU − c) DA(PU ; Px) − (PU − c) DB(PU ; Px).
Note that our assumption that profits are concave implies that (Pi; Px) is
concave in Pi.
Note also that (i) (c; Px) < 0 (because at Pi = c, the second term is zero.
Since the firm could have chosen PU = PA under uniform pricing, but did
not, it must therefore be the case that the sum of the third and fourth terms
exceeds the first term); (ii) (PB; Px) > 0 (because the profit from direct
price discrimination exceeds that from uniform pricing); (iii) (PU ; Px) > 0
(because the second and fourth terms cancel out and the first term exceeds
the third term); and (iv) (PA; Px) < 0 (because PU is the unique optimal
uniform price).
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Fig. 3 (Pi; Px) P P
c P PB U AP
P
These observations, along with the concavity of (Pi; Px), imply that for
any given Px, there are two solutions to (Pi; Px) = 0. We denote these
solutions by PL and PH , respectively, where c < PL < PB and PU < PH < PA
(see Fig. 3). As Px varies along its domain, we can define the locus of such
solutions by PL = PL(Px) and PH = PH(Px), respectively, with the properties
that c < PL(Px) < PB(Px) and PU (Px) < PH(Px) < PA(Px).
Our assumptions imply that PL(Px) and PH(Px) are continuous in Px, from
which it follows that there exists Px such that Px = PL(Px), and similarly,
there exists Px such that Px = PH(Px). If the solutions are unique, then we
denote the Px that satisfies Px = PL(Px) by PPML and the Px that satisfies Px =
PH(Px) by PPMH . If the solutions are not unique, then we denote the smallest
solution to Px = PL(Px) by PPML , and the largest solution to Px = PH(Px)
by PPMH (see Fig. 4). In either case, whether these solutions are unique or
not, we have the interpretation that for all Px < PPML and Px > P
PM
H , uniform
pricing yields strictly higher profit than the profit that would arise under price
matching.
Fig. 4 Solutions to
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